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JOHN W. TERRY, 
Petitioner, 
-vs.- No. 67 
STATE OF OHIO, 
Respondent. 
Washington, D.C. 
Tuesday, December 12, 1967 
The above-entitled case came on for oral argument at 12:10 
o'clock p.m., 
BEFORE: 
EARL WARREN, Chief Justice of the United States 
HUGO L. BLACK, Associate Justice 
WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS, Associate Justice 
JOHN M. HARLAN, Associate Justice 
WILLIAM J. BRENNAN, JR., Associate Justice 
POTTER STEWART, Associate Justice 
BYRON R. WHITE: Associate Justice 
ABE FORT FORTAS, Associate Justice 
THURGOOD MARSHALL, Associate Justice 
APPEARANCES: 
LOUIS STOKES, ESQ., on behalf of Petitioner. 
REUBEN M. PAYNE, ESQ., on behalf of Respondent. 
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PROCEEDINGS 
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN: Number 67, John W. Terry, et 
al., Petitioners, versus Ohio. 
Mr. Stokes? 
ORAL ARGUMENT OF LOUIS STOKES, ESQ., 
ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER 
MR. STOKES: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: 
State versus Terry comes to this Court by virtue of a writ of 
certiorari granted to the Ohio State Supreme Court. This case origi-
nally arose in the Common Pleas Court of Cuyahoga County, 
based upon the indictment for carrying a concealed weapon, in 
violation of Ohio Revised Code, Section 2923.01. 
The defendant in this case filed a motion to suppress the evidence
dence, and at the trial there was a hearing on the motion. After 
hearing the motion, the motion was overruled and the case proceeded
ceeded to trial. This was a bench trial, jury having been waived. 
After hearing the evidence, the motion originally filed was 
overruled again. The defendant was convicted of carrying a 
concealed weapon. The trial court ruled by opinion in this case, 
and we then appealed to the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga 
County. This Court sustained and affirmed the conviction of the 
lower court. This Court also wrote an opinion. 
Subsequently, application was made to the Ohio State 
Supreme Court, for review, and that court dismissed the applica-
tion for review stating: no debatable constitutional question. This 
Court granted certiorari. 
The facts in this case are these-and I think they are signally 
important, if we are to try to arrive at the proper verdict, with 
reference to this case: This incident occurred at 2:30 in the after-
noon, in broad daylight in the downtown section of Cleveland, 
Ohio. The police officer in this case, one Martin McFadden, 
noticed two Negro males standing at the comer of Fourteenth 
Street, in the City of Cleveland, where Euclid Avenue and Huron 
Road intersect. These two streets, if the Court please, form a triangle
angle at the apex of East Fourteenth Street. The police officer was 
approximately 100 feet away from where these two men were. He 
positioned himself-
I 
MR. JUSTICE STEWARTART: What kind of neighborhood is that, 
generally, in Cleveland? A business neighborhood? 
MR. STOKES: That is our downtown business section of the 
City, Your Honor. 
MR. JUSTICE STEWARTART: Downtown retail stores, and offices, 
and so on? 
MR. STOKES: Yes, Your Honor. 
The testimony of the police officer was that there was busi-
ness as usual in the downtown center of the City; stores were open 
and there were pedestrians on the street. 
MR. JUSTICE STEWARTART: What time of day was it? 
MR. STOKES: 2:30 in the afternoon. 
MR. JUSTICE STEWART: On a weekday? 
MR. STOKES: On a weekday. 
The police officer stated that he positioned himself in the 
doorway of a department store by the name of Rogauffs. For a 
period of 10 to 12 minutes, he observed these two males at the 
comer. Alternately, each made five or six trips over to stores 
located on Huron Road. He said that he didn't know whether it 
was the United Airlines store, or the Diamond Store, but the 
stores were immediately adjacent to one another on Huron Street. 
During these five or six trips that they made during the ten or 
twelve minute period, a third male came by-white male-who 
stood and talked with the two males for a moment or so and then 
the other male proceeded west, on Euclid A venue, and the two 
males continued on this comer. After the ten to twelve minute 
period, the two men then walked west on Euclid Avenue, some 
several hundred feet down Euclid A venue. 
When they arrived at Zucker's Store, which is in the vicinity of 
Ninth Street, or Eleventh Street, there on Euclid A venue, the 
three males then again met up, at which time the three of them-
according to the police officer's testimony-were merely standing 
in front of Zuckers Store-
MR. JUSTICE STEWARTART: What kind of a store is Zuckers 
Store? 
MR. STOKES: Zuckers is a haberdashery, Your Honor. 
His testimony was that their backs were to the plate glass 
windows. They were facing the street. And when interrogated with 
reference to what they were doing, he said they were merely 
standing there talking. He described their gait away from Four-
teenth Street as they walked down to the haberdashery as a 
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normal walk-nothing unusual about it. 
The police officer then says, "I then went over to the three 
men. I said to them, 'I'm a police officer. What are your 
names?'" In the first instance, he said: "They gave it to me 
quick." In all other places in the record, he says: "They 
mumbled something." He said, at this: "I then reached out and 
got Terry. I spun him around, holding him in front of me. I then 
began to pat him down." Once he patted him-patted this man 
down-he says: "I felt inside of his top coat what felt to be the 
handle of a gun. I then reached inside the coat and tried to 
remove the gun. I could not remove the gun. I therefore took the 
entire coat off of him and then took the gun out of the coat." 
At this point, he says: "I ordered the three of them into the 
store. As I walked through the doorway, I said to the store per-
sonnel, 'Order the wagon.'" He later explained that "ordering the 
wagon'' means you are then under arrest. Once inside the store, 
the three men were ordered up against the wall, whereupon he 
then searched Chilton. Inside of Chilton's top coat, he also found 
a loaded revolver. He searched the third male, Katz, upon whom 
he found nothing. 
He then calls these men to be removed from the haberdashery 
to the Cleveland Police Station. When they arrived at the police 
station, they were then booked for investigation. Some time late 
the next day, after having been interrogated the following 
morning, these men were then charged, officially late the second 
day, with carrying concealed weapons. 
The police officer testified further with reference to questions 
propounded to him having tobear on the question of probable 
cause. We asked him, "Did you know any of these men?" "No." 
"Had you ever seen any of these men previously?" "No." "Had 
anyone given you any information regarding them?" "No." 
He was then asked what had attracted his attention to them. 
He said, "Well, to tell the truth, I didn't like them. And I was 
attracted to their actions up there on Founeenth Street.'' 
MR. JUSTICE BLACK: He said what? "I didn't like-"? 
MR. STOKES: In the record, Mr. Justice-
MR. JUSTICE BLACK: What was his answer? 
MR. STOKES: He said, "Well, to tell you the truth, I didn't like 
them." 
MR. JUSTICE BLACK: He "didn't like them"? 
MR. STOKES: Yes. Then, he said funher, Mr. Justice, that: "I 
was attracted to their actions there at Fourteenth Street." 
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This officer testified further, though, that he felt that they 
might be casing the place for a stick-up. We then-the Court then 
inquired of him, specifically, if he had ever-and by the way, this 
police officer had been a police officer for 39 years, and a 
detective for 35 years. 
MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN: Was he in plain clothes? 
MR. STOKES: He was in plain clothes, Your Honor. The Court 
specifically asked him if he had, during his 39 years as a police 
officer, previously observed anyone "casing a place." He said, 
"No," he had not. When asked if he had arrested anyone for 
"casing a place," in his 39 years, he said that be had not. 
We should like to make reference, just briefly: to the decision 
of the lower court in this matter. Our court held, in that opinion, 
that "There is no evidence that any warrant had been issued for a 
search, or frisk, and I am not going to stress the facts and state 
that there was a lawful arrest prior to the frisk of the defendants. 
I believe it would be stretching the facts beyond reasonable comprehension
prehension, and foolhardy, to say there was an unlawful arrest 
because there wasn't from the facts as presented." 
Later, in this same opinion, our trial court said: ''I believe, 
and I reiterate again, that search and seizure laws cannot be 
applied to this particular situation, although Mr. Reuben Payne 
endeavors to show there was a lawful arrest. But the Court cannot 
agree. If there was an arrest, it came subsequent to the frisk." 
The Court then based its decision upon Ker v. California. 
The Court said that the Ker decision did not preclude the states 
from developing workable rules in order to bring about effective 
law enforcement in the states. The Court said, with reference to 
the acquisition of the gun, that the gun was the fruit of the frisk 
and that probable cause arose once the police officer had frisked, 
found the gun; he then had the probable cause to arrest. 
Our Court of Appeals, in affirming the decision, stated that: 
"A policeman may, under appropriate circumstances, reasonably 
inquire of a person concerning his suspicious on-the-street 
behavior, in the absence of reasonable grounds to arrest." Our 
court admitted that in all probability this would lead to abuses by 
the police, but then went on to say that: "The Court would deal 
with the abuses as they arose before the Court." 
The Court stated, further, that this of course was just a 
minor inconvenience with the personal liberty that is guaranteed, 
and that therefore each citizen ought to be willing to give up this 
amount of his personal liberty in order that they might have effective
tive law enforcement in the community. 
Our Court offered this definition of arrest: "That as the term 
is used in criminal law, it signifies the apprehension or detention 
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of the person of another in order that he may be forthcoming to 
answer an alleged or supposed crime." 
They distinguished Henry v. U.S., by saying that in that case 
the Government had made a concession, and therefore when this 
Court rendered Henry that it was rendering it on the unique situa-
tion where the government had come in and conceded that at the 
time the automobile was stopped, the arrest had occurred and 
they, therefore, said this Court had not, in that case, rendered an 
independent view of the facts; and, in fact, had held that this was 
an arrest in the absence of probable cause. 
MR. JUSTICE FORTAS I suppose that your contention here is 
that the policemen had-there is nothing in the record to indicate 
that the policeman had any reason to fear bodily harm to himself? 
MR. STOKES: Well, we're saying that; and we're saying this, in 
addition to that, Your Honor. We are saying that, at the point 
this police officer approached these men, and at the point he laid 
his hands on the citizen, that he had-he did not have the prob-
able cause that is required. He has stated that all he had, at that 
point, was this intuitive sixth sense, and that he had never in his 
long experience as a police officer ever arrested anyone for this 
purpose. 
MR. JUSTICE FORTAS: I understand that. But we have to think 
about your case, and the preceding cases, in whatever relationship 
may be appropriate, one to the other. And here there is no sug-
gestion, is there, that the policeman had any basis for fear as to 
his own safety? Am I right? Because there is nothing in the record 
to indicate that. 
MR. STOKES: There is nothing in the record whatsoever, and we 
might add-
MR. JUSTICE FORTAS: What happened here, and perhaps it 
would be your contention that the policeman was engaged in a 
search for evidence when he spun Terry around and put his hand 
inside of his coat. Is that your position? 
MR. STOKES: This is our position, Mr. Justice Fortas. 
MR. JUSTICE STEWART: I don't understand your answer to 
Mr. Justice Fortas when you said there is "nothing in the record 
to indicate," that the policeman didn't have concern for his own 
personal safety, because I thought he said that, based on his intui-
tion, he thought these people were casing the place in order to rob 
it. Isn't that what he said? 
MR. STOKES: This is what he said. 
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MR. JUSTICE STEWART: Well presumably, then, they would 
be armed; and the minute he walked up to talk to them, he would 
quite reasonably be concerned for his own personal safety, I 
should think. 
MR. STOKES: Well, if I understood Mr. Justice Fortas's 
question correctly, I understood him to say: Was there anything in 
the record which indicated he had any reason to be concerned 
with his own personal safety? 
MR. JUSTICE STEWART: Well this is in the record, that he 
thought-whether with, or without, reasonable cause-he thought 
or suspected that these were armed robbers about ready to hold 
up a place. And I suppose that if you walk up to such people, and 
begin asking them embarrassing questions, you might have some 
little concern for your safety if you bona fidedly believe that they 
have weapons on them. Now that much is in the record. 
MR. STOKES: Yes, Your Honor. 
MR. JUSTICE FORTAS: Is that so? Excuse me? Does the record 
show that he had-or he thought these men were armed, before he 
put his hands on them? 
MR. STOKES: Yes. He says-after he says he thought they might 
be casing the place-"and I felt that they might have guns". He 
did say that. 
MR. JUSTICE FORTAS: He testified to that effect? 
MR. STOKES: Yes, he did. 
But, in both our lower court and in our Appellate Coun, in 
stating that a police officer should inquire promptly into suspi-
cious on-the-street activity, we brought out the fact-and the 
record will show-that there was no interrogation, there was no 
investigation in this case as a result of the officer approaching 
him. The court said he had the right to approach, to investigate, 
and to interrogate. But the only question in the record is: "What 
are your names?" At which point, he then grabbed Terry, spun 
him around, and began his search. 
During the interim period while they were waiting for the 
other police to arrive, there was no conversation between the 
police officer-
MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN: But, Mr. Stokes, do you really think 
that if there is enough to suggest that he had reason to believe 
they had weapons-if that's so-and, if he is justified for that 
reason in asking them what they were doing, don't you think he 
would be justified in the first instance in confirming whether or 
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not they did have weapons before he went on further to interrogate
gate them, or even to interrogate them at all? 
MR. STOKES: Well, if I understand your question properly, Mr. 
Justice, you do preface it by saying "if there is enough"? 
MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN: That is right, yes, in this colloquy 
you and Mr. Justice Fortas and Mr. Justice Stewart were having, 
on the premise that it was reasonable for him to think that they 
had weapons. 
MR. STOKES: Well, if there was enough-if the constitutional 
criteria had been met, I would say: Yes, I have no quarrel with the 
fact that where one makes a valid arrest-
MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN: Well, did you quarrel with the fact 
that-or do you suggest there had to be more than appeared, 
before he could ask them a question? 
MR. STOKES: No, I say if he wanted to, he had the right to ask 
them a question. 
MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN: Well, now, if he had the right to ask 
them a question-lay that aside for a moment-and he also had 
reason to think they might have weapons on them, would he have 
to question before he frisked them for weapons? 
MR. STOKES: If we are to say, first, that he has a right to ques-
tion, I am saying that he can exercise a discretion if he chooses. I 
am not saying that, at that point, he has an absolute right to ques-
tion them. 
MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN: No. Would he, in your view, be 
abusing any right of the three of them in walking up to them and 
asking their names and what they were doing? 
MR. STOKES: Yes, I am saying that, Mr. Justice. I am saying 
that where a citizen is on the streets, and where all of the criteria 
that we know of by way of the development of probable cause is 
absent, in that situation-
MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN: That, then, the officer has no right 
to stop and ask: What's your name? What are you doing here? Is 
that it? 
MR. STOKES: Well, if we are going to use the absolute term "no 
right," and we're to be held to that, then I would just have to say 
he has no right. It seems to me that if he wants to exercise some 
discretion on his part, of walking up and posing a question-
asking a name, asking an address-this is a right he has. By the 
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same token, the person whose liberty is being invaded, the person 
who has committed no overt wrong, and the person who is only a 
suspect, at that point-
MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN: Well, may we try to get at it, in this 
way, Mr. Stokes: Up to the point where he "spun Terry around," 
had he done anything outside what a policeman might properly 
do? 
MR. STOKES: No. He had done nothing outside of what a 
policeman might ordinarily do. 
MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN: Now, if then at that juncture he had 
reason to believe they might be armed, did he have to complete his 
questioning first? Or could he frisk them? 
MR. STOKES: I would say that under the circumstances 
presented to me, he did not under those circumstances have the 
right to lay hands on this citizen and spin him around. 
MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN: And this would be because you do 
not think the record shows that he had any reason to believe they 
had weapons? 
MR. STOKES: No, I am saying that at the point that you lay the 
hand on the citizen, and you begin to exercise dominion on that 
citizen on the street by spinning him around, I am saying, in order 
for you to do this you must have the probable cause that is 
required to place a person under arrest, because if the person is 
substantially under your custody, yqur dominion-
MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN: Then you mean he can't frisk for 
weapons, without probable cause to arrest? Is that what you're 
saying? 
MR. STOKES: Yes. 
MR. JUSTICE BLACK: How long had he been observing? 
MR. STOKES: A period of ten to twelve minutes, Your Honor. 
It seems to us, and of course our position is in this case, that 
the Mapp exclusionary rule under the Founh Amendment would 
apply to this situation. We're not here advocating any change with 
reference to the Founh Amendment. It seems to us that the State 
is in the position of saying to the Court that they are not satisfied 
with the Mapp exclusionary rule. And, as we read the rule-as we 
read Mapp-we don't see where the Coun carved out any 
exception with relation to a gun. It seems to us that the Coun said 
that any arrest based upon anything other than a probable cause is 
an unreasonable arrest, and that all of the evidence must be 
excluded. 
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We think that the deterrent that Mapp affords us with respect 
to illegal searches and seizures is something that we are willing to 
continue living with. And although Terry is before you, we think 
it goes much farther than this. We think that when the State is 
saying that there is something called "reasonably suspects," "reasonable
sonable suspicion," as it is put in some jurisdictions, and they're 
asking this Court to relax the Fourth Amendment, as it is known, 
they are in effect asking this Court to nullify the Fourth Amend-
ment and to overrule Mapp v. Ohio. 
We think, therefore, that if this is to prevail, that it is for the 
State to be able to persuade this Court that this Court has some-
where in history permitted something other than probable cause to 
determine whether an arrest and a search and seizure is probable, 
or one that is impermissible. Some of the jurisdictions-
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN: Mr. Stokes, I wonder if that 
could be broken down a little? I wonder what you would say to 
this: Of course the police officer does have the right to investigate 
a crime; and this police officer, in this instance, had the right to 
investigate the crime. He did see what one might well say were 
suspicious acts on the part of the people whom he thought might 
be preparing to commit a crime. 
He had a right, did he not, to pursue that further to deter-
mine whether or not he would have probable cause, perhaps, for 
an arrest? Pursuant to that, he went to talk to these men. Now, 
because of the nature of the crime that he suspected-a robbery-
he felt that when he went into the company of these three men, 
against himself alone, that he was in a dangerous position; and, 
that, therefore, he had probable cause to see if they had weapons 
on them, not because he had proper cause to believe they had 
committed a crime, but because in investigative matters he had 
probable cause to believe that his life was in danger. 
Now under those circumstances, would you think that he did, 
or did not have a right to ascertain whether he was in a position of 
danger, by seeing if they had weapons? 
MR. STOKES: Only if we're going to relax the standard of prob-
able cause, as we know it, under the Fourth Amendment. He 
didn't permit this situation to ripen into the point where it had 
ripened into a probable-cause-type of a situation. He was a little 
ahead of himself, in this situation, and our position would have to 
be that you don't have a right to protect a constitutionally imper-
missible arrest; and, consequently, this is the way we would have 
to answer it. 
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN: Police officers are very often 
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in a position where they might not be able to make an actual 
arrest, but they are in a position of great danger. Now, where they 
are in a position of great danger, are they in a position to protect 
themselves from violence, by looking into the situation to see if 
anyone is armed to do them violence? 
MR. STOKES: Yes, Mr. Chief Justice. He certainly has a right of 
self-defense, and he has a right to protect himself. But the 
product, once it has been removed-the danger has been 
removed-we are saying that in this case, since it was not based 
upon probable cause, we should not protect the constitutionally 
impermissible arrest, by permitting the yield of that arrest to come 
into evidence against the defendant. 
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN: Take a situation of this kind, 
where a police officer sees someone acting very peculiarly. It 
might not be in connection with any information he has about any 
crime. Maybe the person is abnormal, mentally. Maybe he thinks 
he's insane and he wants to talk to him. But the man shows indi-
cations, he thinks, of violence and he wants to be sure he won't be 
attacked when he goes to talk to him. He goes up to speak to him, 
and also ascertains whether he has any weapon on him. Do you 
think he has a right to do that, as a matter of probable cause that 
he might be injured himself if he doesn't take precautions? 
MR. STOKES: I think we are faced with this, Mr. Chief Justice: 
The average police officer would do this under these circum-
stances. If he felt himself to be in any type of danger, he would 
conduct a search, for the purpose ofprotecting his own life in a 
possibly dangerous situation. But I am saying that we cannot-
merely because of that type of situation, and it not being what is 
required by the Fourth Amendment-we can't give sanctity to it 
by way of saying: Since you did find this product, we're going to 
permit it into the evidence. 
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN: I'm not arguing with you. I'm 
just seeing how far we have to go in a situation of this kind. 
That's the only reason I put my question. 
MR. STOKES: Certainly, Your Honor. 
Another thing I think the Court has to take into considera-
tion here, of course, is the impossibility that this Court has of 
standardizing such a subjective thing as "intuition." All the 
amicus briefs say: Permit us this standard that is less than 
probable cause; permit us to stop and frisk people on the streets. 
Now experience has already taught us, if the Court please, that 
policemen have had enough difficulty being able to grapple with 
and to determine for themselves what is tantamount to probable 
10 
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cause, as it has been enunciated in the decisions by this Court. 
Now they're saying to this Court: Give us another standard. Give 
us this, "reasonably suspects,,, or "based upon suspicion," or 
whatever the standard is that's less than probable cause. And we 
think that we're just compounding the policeman's problems if 
the Court does permit this type of a thing to occur. 
With reference to the basic guarantee that we are concerned 
about here, I don't think we are so much concerned, really, about 
Terry, because over the years it has been the person who has been 
involved in criminal activity that has come before this Court in 
order for this Court to again take a look at some of our basic 
constitutional guarantees. And I think, through Terry, that we 
look at the hundreds of people walking the street by the day, 
because police officers, or a police officer, finds himself observing 
a situation where he says, as he did in this case, "Well, to tell you 
the truth, I just didn't like them and then I began watching 
them." And then the fact that he wants to go further-and at that 
point, I think we're subjecting all of the people who have this 
inviolate right of privacy, to this type of activity on the public 
streets throughout our nation. 
I would like to reserve five minutes of my time. 
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN: Mr. Payne? 
ORAL ARGUMENT OF REUBEN M. PAYNE, ESQ., 
ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT 
MR. PAYNE: Mr. Chief Justice, if it please the members of the 
Court: 
At the outset, may I direct my attention to page 19 of my 
brief. There it is indicated that after the officer had testified that 
he observed the conduct of these men, and that he had concluded 
that they were casing an establishment for a robbery, we find this 
quote appearing from the record: "Question: Detective McFad-
den, can you tell us why you turned John Terry around facing the 
other two men, with you behind him?" "Answer: Due to my ob-
servation, the observation on Huron Road of these two men, I felt 
as though they were going to pull a stick-up and they may have a 
gun." That is supported and substantiated in the record of this 
particular case. 
A question has been asked here: What is the difference 
between "reasonable suspicion," and "probable cause"? In one 
instance, in the arguments of the case before this Court, the Court 
of Appeals in the Peters case, has said: "It is that cause which is 
somewhat below probable cause on the scale of absolute know-
ledge of criminal activity." 
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MR. JUSTICE BLACK: The question I had in my mind was 
this-I can understand why you have a difference of words-this 
"scale a little below." I can't, myself, see any difference in-I'm 
talking about conduct-in having a "reasonable suspicion" some-
thing is about to be done, and in "having probable cause to 
believe" something is about to be done. 
MR. PAYNE: I cannot see any basic difference in having a 
reasonable suspicion and equating it with the term ''probable 
cause," in and of itself. It has been indicated that we have asked 
for a different standard here, as to probable cause. I find no 
problem with this, particularly, because I do not ask fora dif-
ferent standard of probable cause, as it may relate to the right to 
lawfully arrest a person. 
I think the quantum of evidence that is basic and essential 
under the circumstances to establish probable cause for the officer 
to arrest, or to stop a person and to ask him questions, may be 
somewhat lesser in degree but, by the same token, it is probable 
cause under any circumstances. The same circumstances are indi-
cated-
MR. JUSTICE BLACK: What do you understand "probable 
cause" to mean? 
MR. PAYNE: I understand "probable cause" to mean, for an 
arrest, that-
MR. JUSTICE BLACK: Wait a second. "Probable cause to 
believe something will happen." What do you mean when you say 
that? 
MR. PAYNE: When a person is observed in circumstances which 
suggest that he has committed, or is about to commit a felony or a 
misdemeanor, and such action is reasonably necessary to enable 
the officer to determine the lawfulness of the person's conduct; 
and the key word here is the "circumstances" at that particular 
time. 
MR. JUSTICE BLACK: Would you mind telling me, in your 
language-plain ordinary language-what you understand to be 
meant when somebody says, for that reason, says that a thing is 
"probable cause to believe that something will happen"? 
MR. PAYNE: I understand that to mean the taking into consider-
ation of the totality of the circumstances, as a responsible person 
views it, at that particular time in relation to his work. For 
example, the police officer here, in taking in the totality of the 
circumstances that he observed, under the conditions which he 
observed them, that the conduct that existed and the ideas that 
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maybe were flowing from the conduct which he observed here, 
would establish probable cause. 
MR. JUSTICE BLACK: Do you understand it to mean reason-
able grounds to believe something is going to happen? 
MR. PAYNE: I understand-I believe that it does mean reason-
able grounds that something is going to happen. 
MR. JUSTICE BLACK: It does not mean, does it, that it's bound 
to happen? 
MR. PAYNE: It does not mean that it is bound to happen. 
MR. JUSTICE BLACK: Therefore, you've got to have something 
that is "reasonable grounds" for saying you believe it will 
happen. 
MR. PAYNE: I agree with you, sir. 
MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL: Mr. Payne, in this case this arrest-
ing officer testified, did he not, that he had never seen anybody 
"case a joint"? 
MR. PAYNE: That is correct; he did so testify. 
MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL: He also testified that he had been 
on that same area for some thirty years, doing the following 
things: Checking for pick-pockets, and shoplifters? 
MR. PAYNE: That's correct. 
MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL: So, where did he get his expertise 
about somebody about to commit a robbery? 
MR. PAYNE: I think that he would get his expertise by virtue of 
the fact that he had been a member of the police department for 
forty years, and by being a member of the police department for 
forty years I am quite sure that, even if by osmosis, some know-
ledge would have to come to him of the various degrees of 
crimes-
MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL: Now we're getting intuition by 
osmosis? 
[Laughter.] 
MR. PAYNE: Not at all, sir. Not at all. 
MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL: I'm sorry. 
MR. PAYNE: I didn't mean to imply that; nor did I mean any 
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disrespect by so using that particular term. I think that, for exam-
ple, if I as a lawyer am around a particular office for a number of 
years, that I certainly must gain knowledge about various 
concepts of law that may come about from time to time. 
MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL: There are exceptions to this. 
[General laughter.] 
MR. PAYNE: I would agree with the Court, in the circumstances 
also. 
MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL: Seriously, Mr. Payne, the point is 
that the only thing he noticed was: A man leaves from a position 
of talking to another man, and goes across the street, looks in a 
window, and goes back. Now, number one, you will agree that 
everybody who looks in a public window is not "casing the 
joint"? 
MR. PAYNE: I agree. 
MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL: But they did it twice, or three 
times. How many times? 
MR. PAYNE: It was-
MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL: It is not too clear to me from the 
record. 
MR. PAYNE: May I then, in response to the Justice' s question, 
indicate first of all, and clarify this, his testimony was not that he 
"didn't like him." His testimony was that he " didn't like their 
looks." Now I don't think that he meant by that any reference to 
pigmentation or anything else. I think that he meant by that, 
when we take the entire record into consideration-the fact that 
this was in a downtown area, that these people were not contin-
uing in the regular flow of commerce as were other people on the 
street-
MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL: That they "beared watching," you 
would say? 
MR. PAYNE: I'm sorry. I didn't-
MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL: They "beared watching"? 
MR. PAYNE: They beared watching. 
They were standing on the comer conversing. Then, because 
of their not continuing in the flow of regular commerce, he 
observed one of the petitioners walk away from the other one and 
proceed approximately 100 feet west, up the street. He noticed the 
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unusual activity of this petitioner peering into the jewelry store, or 
the airline office there, that there was something in the vicinity of 
the airline office-or the jewelry store-which excited the 
petitioner's attention in some manner, or in some way. He then 
returned to his companion on the corner, had a conversation with 
his companion; his companion, in turn alternately proceeded up 
the street, and conducted himself in the very same manner; that 
they alternated in this way, four or five times; that, thereupon, a 
third man came from across the street and bad a conversation 
with them and after having that conversation with them; that the 
third man returned back across the street and stationed himself 
there; that these individuals then engaged in the conduct which I 
have described previously, four or five additional trips after that. 
And, that then after engaging in these additional trips, 
making a total of some ten to twelve trips, he observed that their 
interest was centered on the jewelry store or the airline office; that 
after so making the total number of trips, they then went across 
the street, and there again the three men came together, at which 
time they were having a conversation and at which time the officer 
had concluded that they were casing the establishment for a stick-
up. 
Under these circumstances, I say to the Court that the taking 
into consideration that an officer who is by himself, taking into 
consideration the number of persons involved-
MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL: But didn't your own court say they 
did not have probable cause to arrest, as of this point we are now 
talking about? · 
MR. PAYNE: The trial court indicated that, at this point, that 
there was not probable cause for arrest. The appellate court did 
indicate that there was probable cause for arrest, after the frisk 
took place. 
MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL: No, I mean-well, we haven't 
frisked him yet. 
MR PAYNE: That is correct. 
MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL: So he didn't have probable cause 
to arrest, when he approached. 
MR. PAYNE: I would agree with this. 
MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL: And he didn't get probable cause 
until he put his hands on the butt of the gun. 
MR. PAYNE: He didn't get probable cause to arrest-
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MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL: -him until he put his hands on the 
butt of the gun, in his inside coat pocket. 
MR. PAYNE: No, sir. 
MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL: Is that right? 
MR. PAYNE: No, sir. 
MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL: When did he get probable cause to 
arrest? 
MR. PAYNE: He received probable cause for arrest when he 
turned Terry around and ran his hands over the outside of his 
clothing and, feeling a gun in the upper left-breast pocket, and 
indicating emphatically at that time that, ''What I felt was a gun, 
a weapon." 
MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL: Well, he didn't have it, as counsel 
for petitioner says, he didn't have it when he laid hands on him 
and turned him around? 
MR. PAYNE: I would agree. He did not have probable cause to 
arrest. 
MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL: Right. 
MR. PAYNE: I would agree that he would have probable cause to 
frisk, or to lay hands on him, at this point. 
MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL: Why? 
MR. PAYNE: Because of the nature of the circumstances and 
protection of his own life. 
MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL: He didn't say he saw the gun bulg-
ing, or anything like that? 
MR. PAYNE: No, he did not say that he saw a gun bulging. He 
indicated that: "They were casing a joint for a robbery," which 
implies a crime of violence, which implies that they have a gun. 
That, coupled with the fact that after he made an identification of 
himself when approaching these men, and indicated to them that 
he was a police officer, that the response which they gave was in 
the manner of evading the question which he had put to them, 
under these circumstances I think that-
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN: What was the colloquy at that 
point? 
MR. PAYNE: The question which was put to them by the officer: 
"What are your names?" As to this, there was a mumbled, 
16 
709 
710 
incoherent response made in reply to that particular question. 
And this, of course, coupled with his observations and conclu-
sions which he had made previously, there was probable cause for 
this officer to further investigate for weapons, under these cir-
cumstances, to determine and to protect his own life here. 
Now, it is my contention-
MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN: Mr. Payne, you have said repeatedly 
now, if I understand you, that "probable cause"-are you saying 
something like this: that while there may not have been probable 
cause to arrest, in the sense of taking him to the police station and 
booking him for some crime, that at least in these circumstances 
there was probable cause to "arrest," in the sense of asking them 
questions such as: Who are you, and what are you doing here? Is 
that what you're saying? 
MR. PAYNE: I hesitate in the use of the term "arrest." 
MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN: You are saying "probable cause," in 
these circumstances-and I gather what you must mean-is that if 
the detainment is an arrest, it was to be a detention only long 
enough to find out what they were doing. Is that correct? 
MR. PAYNE: That is correct. 
MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN: And that then, if the officer had 
probable cause to think they had weapons on them, that in those 
circumstances he was justified in frisking them for weapons. Is 
that it? 
MR. PAYNE: That is correct. And, too, if I may put it in my 
own language, I am saying that there was probable cause for the 
officer to interfere with their freedom of action, at this point, and 
that such interference with their freedom of action is not in a 
significant way at this time. 
MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN: Well that's what I understood to be 
your argument in the use of "probable cause." What you're really 
doing is saying you don't have to change the label; it's still 
probable cause, and it's still an arrest-but an "arrest," for the 
purpose merely of asking the question: Who are you and why are 
you here? And this is a different thing than an arrest for the 
purpose of taking them to the station house and booking them for 
a crime. Is that it? 
MR. PAYNE: Under Ohio law, I could not agree with this 
concept because under Ohio law the definition of "arrest," is by 
statute. 
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MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN: Well, forgetting Ohio law for a 
moment, how about for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment? 
MR. PAYNE: For the purposes of the Fourth Amendment, it 
would be reasonable action on the pan of this officer-
MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN: But I thought you agreed with 
Justice Black before, that really, reasonable action and probable 
cause are pretty much synonymous terms? 
MR. PAYNE: I do, Your Honor. 
MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN: So we can stick to the jargon "probable
able cause" and make the distinction that way? 
MR. PAYNE: I agree. I think that the Court can stick to the 
jargon of "probable cause" and make any distinctions under the 
circumstances in this respect. 
MR. JUSTICE BLACK: As I see it, what you and your case are 
really substantially arguing is that to stop a man, or to ask him a 
question by an officer, is not an "arrest" under the Fourth 
Amendment description of an arrest? 
MR. PAYNE: It is not an arrest. 
MR. JUSTICE BLACK: It seems to me that that's the real basis 
of your argument. What you're talking about is an arrest, and 
you're saying it doesn't arrest him to ask him a question. 
MR. PAYNE: It does not arrest himto ask him a question. 
MR. JUSTICE BLACK: And I imagine you're saying, also, it 
doesn't necessarily arrest him to touch him? 
MR. PAYNE: It does not arrest him to touch him. 
MR. JUSTICE BLACK: It might be an assault, but not an 
"arrest," under the constitutional meaning? 
MR PAYNE: It does not interfere with his freedom in a 
significant way. 
MR. JUSTICE BLACK: He hasn't taken him into custody, you 
say? 
MR. PAYNE: That is correct. 
MR. JUSTICE BLACK: That is, under an arrest? 
MR. PAYNE: That is absolutely correct. 
MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN: Well, Mr. Payne, that's not quite the 
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same thing you said to me. 
[Pause.] 
MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN: I don't understand. I thought you 
said to me earlier that there might be an arrest, for some 
purposes; and an arrest for some other purposes-Fourth Amend-
ment purposes; and that an "arrest," for the purpose of asking a 
chap his name-which follows from a detention-or, "what's he 
doing here," there might be probable cause for that sort of thing 
without any violations, even though it could not be in the same 
circumstances "probable cause" to take him to the station house 
and book him for a crime. 
MR. PAYNE: I did not mean to imply-because I had indicated 
to the Court that certainly "arrest," in Ohio, is defined by 
statute. And I thought I did indicate to the Court that the deten-
tion of his freedom here, at that time, is not an "arrest" in the 
sense that we understand it to be-
MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN: It's certainly not an arrest in the 
sense of taking him to the station house and booking him for a 
crime; but, if he's detained, isn't it in the nature of an "arrest"? 
MR. PAYNE: No. 
MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL: Well, Mr. Payne, couldn't you say 
that when he laid hands on him and swung him around that the 
petitioner's freedom of movement was arrested? 
MR. PAYNE: I would agree that his freedom of movement was 
arrested. 
MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL: But that's not an arrest. 
MR. PAYNE: I do not agree that his freedom of movement was 
arrested ''in a significant way.'' 
MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL: You mean because he only turned 
him around? It didn't take long to tum him around? 
MR. PAYNE: No. I mean in the sense of the circumstances 
involved at that particular time. 
MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL: Well, in this particular case he laid 
hands on him, and swung him around. How many days later was 
he free to go, from that moment on, in this case? 
MR. PAYNE: If there had been no more-
MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL: No. In this particular case, when 
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. did he next get out? When did Terry get his freedom? 
MR. PAYNE: Some time after he was convicted of the crime of 
carrying a concealed weapon. 
MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL: So his freedom was arrested, for 
quite a while. 
MR. PAYNE: Not on the basis of his swinging him around; but· 
on the basis of the concealed weapon which he was carrying, and 
the crime that he was committing in the presence of the officer at 
that time. 
MR. JUSTICE BLACK: You don't deny he was arrested; you're 
arguing about that time before he was arrested. 
MR. PAYNE: That is correct. 
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN: When did the arrest take 
place? Just speaking in ordinary terms, now, not "little arrest," 
or "big arrest," but speaking in ordinary terms, when was he 
arrested? 
MR. PAYNE: Speaking in ordinary terms, he was arrested after 
the officer felt the weapon and ordered them into the interior of 
the store. And it was not until that time, after he felt the weapon 
on the outside-he did insert his hand and feel the butt of the gun 
afterwards, and after taking them on the inside and they were 
placed against the wall; when the coat was pulled from his shoul-
ders and then the gun was taken from out of the pocket of Terry; 
he then went to the other petitioner and patted him on the outside 
of his clothing and thereupon felt a weapon that he had testified 
to-it was after patting on the outside of his clothing, that he 
inserted his hand into his pocket and removed the weapon from 
the second individual, or person involved here. 
So, the arrest took place the moment that he ordered them 
into the store itself. Their freedom of movement was interfered 
with, significantly, at that time so that they could not-
MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN: Let's use the Fourth Amendment 
language, then. When was the first "seizure" of the person? 
MR. PAYNE: The first seizure of the person was at the time that 
he ordered them into the store. 
MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN: You mean when he took Terry and 
swung him around there was no seizure of the person? 
MR. PAYNE: I think there was a "temporary detaining," or 
"interference" with his person. 
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MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN: Well, he had his hands on him and 
he switched him around. Surely-there was no seizure of the 
person? 
MR. PAYNE: But here again we're dealing with simple semantic 
words. 
MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN: That word is in the Fourth Amend-
ment, isn't it? 
MR. PAYNE: I agree that it is, sir. 
MR. JUSTICE BLACK: What is the differenc.e between 
"seizure" and "arrest''? You know, a seizure-you don't seize a 
man-I mean, you may seize him because you "seize" something 
tangible, but that's not what you are talking about in a seizure in 
the Fourth Amendment. I thought it was an arrest? 
MR. PAYNE: It is an arrest that I understand we are discussing in 
this matter. 
MR. JUSTICE BLACK: Also, you could very easily tum a man 
around, without arresting him, couldn't you? 
MR. PAYNE: I agree with this-
MR. JUSTICE BLACK: It might not be "easy," depending on 
his size-
MR. PAYNE: -that he could very easily tum the man around, 
and some may term that as a "seizure of the person" himself; but 
I would not term it as a seirure of the person himself unless he has 
the intention of taking that person into custody, even though he 
may lay hands on him at that particular time. 
MR. JUSTICE BLACK: Well he undoubtedly did this when he 
ordered them to get into the store and tum their palms towards 
the wall and stand there. At that point, there can be no doubt 
about an arrest, I guess. 
MR. PAYNE: I would agree. I think that the affirmance of the 
conviction of the petitioners on the law in the instant case is 
reasonable, is necessary, and is appropriate to secure the safety 
and the welfare and the best interest of the public of the State of 
Ohio, because we are asking here-and I am, perhaps, bound to 
indicate that the Court of Appeals has suggested in this particular 
case-that we authorize the stopping under these circumstances 
where there are these surrounding circumstances, for the protec-
tion of the officer's life and for the protection to the community 
that will exist if this is not permitted in this manner and this way, 
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depending upon the circumstances that exist at this time. 
The means that is selected, as enunciated by our trial court 
and the Court of Appeals in this case, have a direct substantial 
relationship to the concept of the safety and the welfare sought to 
be obtained in the affirmance of this particular case here. If we 
consider the comments of the trial judge at the time that be gave 
his opinion in connection with this matter, the trial judge made 
these remarks: "I am a great believer of the personal rights pro-
pounded by our Supreme Court, reiterated and reaffirmed, 
neglected over the years and given to us under the Fourth Amend-
ment and other amendments of the Constitution." 
Secondly, the trial court said, "At the same time, a police 
officer cannot, as far as this Court is concerned, and will not be 
permitted to stop and frisk an individual simply because he has a 
suspicion-a mere suspicion-unless there are reasonable circum-
stances justifying the frisk.'' 
Three. "When the circumstances justify, and there is reason-
able suspicion, and for his own personal protection, he may frisk 
to determine if there are weapons-for his personal safety." 
Four. "The officer assigned in the area in which he had been 
placed, doing the job he had been doing, and had reasonable 
cause to believe and to suspect that the defendants were conduct-
ing themselves suspiciously and some interrogation should be 
made of their action." 
Five. "There was reasonable cause in this case for the officer 
to approach these individuals and pat them down.'' 
Here is a decided attempt on the part of the trial judge to 
equate and balance the rights of the individuals with the rights of 
the public and the safety that is involved herein as it pertains to 
the officer in this particular case. What are the "reasonable cause 
circumstances" that existed in the mind of the officer at that 
particular time? 
One, we have a police officer in his particular area, on duty, 
and his duty is to maintain law and order. His duty, too, is to 
prevent crime if he can so do. 
Second, he has 39 years of experience herein. 
Fourth, the observations of the suspicious activity which he 
observed, which may be determined as pre-detention conduct. 
Five, he concludes from the observations and the conduct of 
these men that a crime of violence with the use of weapons in 
probability may be committed under these circumstances. 
Six, he decides to investigate and to interrogate, and the 
record indicates and shows that at this particular time, •'Why did 
you go over to these men?" "I went over to them to ask them 
some questions." 
Eight, when he asked their names, he received this mumbled 
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incoherent response, which further gave rise to the circumstances 
that he had concluded previously that a stick-up was possible 
here. 
At this point, taking into consideration the nature of the 
crime which he has concluded-a stick-up-and the use of wea-
pons as they are characteristically used in a stick-up, there is only 
one course of conduct then open to a prudent police officer. And 
that is, to frisk or pat for weapons, for the protection of his life. 
This is why we consider it in the interest of safety and public 
welfare in the State of Ohio. 
Seven-or, not seven, but-ten, there was the absence of 
assistance to this officer, at this time, in relation to the number of 
individuals involved here. There was one police officer and three 
men. The type of clothing, also, he considered at this particular 
time because they were wearing overcoats, and the possibility that 
they might have concealed weapons, as they did exist here; the sex 
of the subjects, also, I think he had to take into consideration, at 
this particular time. There were three agile, young men that he 
was confronting, and he was by himself at this particular time. 
Under these circumstances that he was confronted with at this 
time, I believe it was· in the interest of public safety; I believe it is 
in the interest of the welfare of the community and society, that 
he have the right, based on these probable cause circumstances, to 
frisk this man, to temporarily detain him, to ascertain that which 
he has observed, and to confiscate any weapons which he might 
find on his person at that particular time; and, that they are 
admissible in the evidence of his trial subsequent thereto. 
I think that if, as the· question was placed by one of the 
Justices of the Court, that after the probable cause that exists here 
in this particular case, I feel that the judgment in the case should 
be affirmed. 
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN: You may have three more 
minutes to finish. 
MR. STOKES: Thank you, Your Honor. 
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN: Your time had expired. 
REBUTTALAL ORAL ARGUMENT OF 
LOUIS STOKES, ESQ., ON 
BEHALF OF PETITIONERS 
MR. STOKES: Thank you very much, Mr. Chief Justice: 
We would just ask the Court to consider that, on the state of 
the record, this police officer is acting upon the suspicion he has 
that these two men are casing a place; that the stores where they 
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are supposedly casing, are located on Huron A venue at Four-
teenth Street at the apex. These men have gone down Euclid 
Avenue, where Huron Avenue cannot even be seen. They are 
standing in front of a store there that has not, on the state of this 
record, been cased at the time they are approached and subjected 
to the arrest. 
We would ask this Court to be mindful, also, of the fact that 
if this Court does affirm this decision, it will in effect be affirming 
the decision rendered by the Court of Appeals, in which they have 
established the fruit-of-the-frisk doctrine for the State of Ohio. I 
would ask you to keep in mind that the State of Ohio's legislature 
has just considered, a few months ago, and rejected a stop-and-
frisk bill similar to that of the State of New York. 
Lastly, we would ask you to consider, in accordance with 
decisions such as DeRay, where this Court has said a search is 
either good or bad when it starts, and it does not change character 
thereafter; and, that the after-the-event justification does not 
relate back to justify the original, initial unlawful search. 
Thank you. 
MR. JUSTICE BLACK: Let me ask you if this is not what you're 
really asking us to hold-I'm not saying we shouldn't. You ask us 
to hold, as I understand it, that no officer has a right to interrogate
gate people, and expect to get an answer, unless he already has in 
his possession, or in his mind, evidence sufficient to show 
probable cause that that person has committed a crime, or is 
about to commit one? 
MR. STOKES: I can't take it that far. 
MR. JUSTICE BLACK: Well, how far would you take it? 
MR. STOKES: I'm saying that where the police officer chooses, 
with reference to whatever his determination has been, to inter-
rogate or to investigate further with respect to citizens lawfully on 
the street, that in order to exercise dominion or custody or control 
over that citizen, and thereby deprive him of his rights under the 
Fourth Amendment, that he must have before approaching him 
that probable cause which this Coun has made reference to in its 
decisions. 
MR. JUSTICE BLACK: Well, what about asking him questions 
and expecting him to answer? 
MR. STOKES: He has the right to approach him and ask his 
questions. 
MR. JUSTICE BLACK: Does he has a right to expect an answer, 
and to do anything whatever if he doesn't get it? 
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MR. STOKES: I think that in the absence of this person having 
committed any crime of any son, and where the approach is based 
on suspicion alone, the person being subjected to the interrogation 
has the right to refuse to answer, or to turn away. 
MR. JUSTICE BLACK: What you're saying is that a policeman 
does not have the right to ask a person a question on the street 
and get an answer, or to keep him, or do anything else except just 
ask him a question, unless he's in possession of sufficient facts to 
know that he has probable cause to believe that that man has 
committed a crime or is about to commit a crime? 
MR. STOKES: Mr. Justice, I'm sorry if I'm giving you the 
impression that a police officer cannot ask him a question. 
MR. JUSTICE BLACK: I said, "can ask him a question," but 
cannot get an answer, and do nothing about it. 
MR. STOKES: He can arrest him, if he chooses. 
MR. JUSTICE BLACK: He can arrest him. But supposing he 
doesn't choose to arrest him? Suppose he wants to do somethiiig-
shon of arresting him? 
MR. STOKES: Then I don't think he has that right. 
MR. JUSTICE BLACK: Then the man can go on off, not answer 
the question because the officer doesn't have at that time a suffi-
cient amount of evidence to make a case of probable cause that he 
has committed a crime? 
MR. STOKES: That is precisely what I'm saying, because other-
wise the Fourth's inviolate right of privacy is being invaded. 
MR. JUSTICE BLACK: Well, that's all. I thought that was it. 
MR. STOKES: Yes, sir. 
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN: Very well, Mr. Stokes. 
MR. STOKES: Thank you. 
[Whereupon, at 2:05 p.m. the oral argument in the above-
entitled matter was concluded.] 
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